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I. INTRODUCTION
The Federal Courts field may be experiencing a methodological
crisis, but if so, it is a methodological crisis of a peculiar kind. The
problem is not that new methodologies threaten traditional modes of
analysis. On the contrary, the difficulty is that we have been doing
largely the same thing for more than forty years--asking much the
same questions formulated by Henry Hart and Herbert Wechsler in
the first edition of The Federal Courts and the Federal System' and
1. Henry M. Hart, Jr. and Herbert Wechsler, eds., The Federal Courts and the Federal
System (Foundation, 1953). Although my discussion in this Article will focus largely on the first
edition of the casebook, two subsequent editions have appeared. The second, published in 1973,
was edited by Paul Bator, Paul Mishldn, David Shapiro, and Herbert Wechsler. Paul M. Bator, et
al., eds., Hart and Wechsler's The Federal Courts and the Federal System (Foundation, 2d ed.
1973). The editors of the third and current edition, which came out in 1988, are Paul Bator, Daniel
Meltzer, Paul Mishkin, and David Shapiro. Paul M. Bator, et al., eds., Hart and Wechler's The
Federal Courts and the Federal System, (Foundation, 3d ed. 1988). For an insightful assessment
of the casebook's evolution from one edition to the next, see Akhil Reed Amer, Law Story, 102
Harv. L. Rev. 688 (1989).
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trying to answer them with roughly the same techniques. Not
surprisingly, a number of people would like to throw off the Hart and
Wechsler yoke and get on with something else. But what?
The restiveness that I sense among many Federal Courts
teachers brings to mind two metaphors. The first is that of oedipal
rebellion.2 Arguably, it is past time when self-respecting legal aca-
demics would have demolished conventions established by such long-
dominant authority figures as Hart and Wechsler. I have my own
share of oedipal urges. On the fourth floor of Harvard Law School's
Griswold Hall, no more than twenty-five feet from my office, hangs a
larger-than-life portrait of Henry Hart. As I gaze at Professor Hart
each morning, I often experience awe at his scholarly achievements,
as reflected not only in the Hart and Wechsler casebook but also in the
equally profound and influential materials on The Legal Process that
he co-authored with Albert Sacks.3 But it is not always gratifying to
work in the shadow of a legend. Among other things, I know that
many colleagues in other fields view work in Hart's shadow as dull
work indeed. When I began teaching Federal Courts twelve years
ago, a former teacher of mine4 described the field as an "intellectual
backwater." It was an area ripe for imaginative revision, he thought.
Yet no fundamental reorientation has occurred in the interim. Why
not?
This question evokes a second metaphor--the notion of a fruit-
ful "paradigm" for thought and research, as made famous by Thomas
Kuhn in his book The Structure of Scientific Revolutions.5 In Kuhnian
terminology, a paradigm is a set of assumptions that defines both a
series of problems worth solving and a framework within which to
seek answers.6 In the Federal Courts field, Hart and Wechsler estab-
2. I use this metaphor very loosely. Compare Sigmund Freud, The Complete Introductory
Lectures on Psychoanalysis 329-38 (Liveright, 1977) (discussing the "oedipus complex," which
arises from male children's sexual jealousy of their fathers, and its role in shaping the male
adolescent's "great task of detaching himself from his parents"). Many modern writers follow
Freud in attributing later-life impulses to rebel against authority to unconscious desires that
themselves are rooted in childhood urges and vulnerabilities. See, for example, Charles Brenner,
An Elementary Textbook of Psychoanalysis 242-58 (Int'l U., 1973). Compare Harold Bloom, The
Anxiety of Influence: A Theory of Poetry 109-10 (Oxford U., 1973) (analogizing the psychological
impulse driving "strong poets," who struggle to demonize and misread their predecessors with the
goal of supplanting and surpassing them, to what Freud termed the "oedipus complex").
3. Henry M. Hart, Jr. and Albert Sacks, The Legal Process: Basic Problems in the Making
and Application of Law (Cambridge, Mass., Tentative ed. 1958).
4. The former teacher was Bruce Ackerman.
5. Thomas S. Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions (U. of Chicago, 2d ed. 1970).
6. See id. at 23-51.
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lished the reigning paradigm. The question suggested by Kuhn is
whether we can imagine a new paradigm that might make revolt
against their dominance fruitful and successful. Or, to revert to the
metaphor of oedipal rebellion, is fuming against Hart and Wechsler
just so much adolescent frustration--psychologically necessary, per-
haps, but a bit hackneyed and juvenile?7
I want to examine these questions by offering a thesis about
why Hart and Wechsler have had such pervasive influence on Federal
Courts teaching and scholarship. My submission is that Hart and
Wechsler defined the field as we now know it, and, what is more, that
their definition links the subject matter of Federal Courts inquiries
almost inextricably to the Legal Process methodology that they like-
wise pioneered. If this thesis is correct, the dominant influence of
Hart and Wechsler may be impossible to escape as long as we accept
the current definition of what constitutes Federal Courts teaching and
scholarship. After developing this argument, I offer a qualified de-
fense against the charge that Federal Courts is an intellectually be-
nighted backwater, and I explore some possible directions of future
scholarship-including the possibility of creative work that pushes
beyond the Hart and Wechsler mold.
II. THE HART AND WECHSLER PARADIGM
Although the pervasive influence of Hart and Wechsler on
Federal Courts scholarship is widely acknowledged, there may be less
agreement on the nature of that influence and the reasons for its
duration. A focus on the substantive positions taken by Hart and
Wechsler does more to mislead than illuminate. The genius of Hart
and Wechsler lay in linking a definition of Federal Courts inquiry to a
method of legal analysis and thereby giving rise to what fairly can be
called an analytical "paradigm."
A. Stances Toward Hart and Wechsler
Hart and Wechsler's most famous substantive positions un-
doubtedly contribute to the worry that contemporary Federal Courts
scholarship occurs in a time warp. Indeed, a substantive review in-
7. Compare Erik H. Erikson, Identity: Youth and Crisis 247 (Norton, 1968) (discussing
why, in order to forge an independent identity, "youth often rejects parents and authorities and
wishes to belittle them as inconsequential").
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vites questions about why the casebook's original edition did not fall
stillborn from the press.8
The first edition of Hart and Wechsler came out in 1953-the
year of Earl Warren's nomination as Chief Justice of the United
States and the year before Brown v. Board of Education.9 In the
Preface, the authors introduced three substantive themes that domi-
nated the book. The first concerned federalism: the role of the federal
courts in a federal system that includes state governments, state
officials, and state courts. 10 To Hart and Wechsler, preserving spheres
of state sovereign autonomy was a matter of foremost importance."
The second theme dominating the original Hart and Wechsler
casebook involved the separation of powers. Reflecting the legacy of
Legal Realism and the New Deal,12 Hart and Wechsler adopted a
loose, functionalist approach. They raised no objection of principle to
administrative agencies or broad reliance on administrative adjudica-
tion; they embraced a law-making role for the federal courts in the
development of federal common law;13 they eschewed starkly positiv-
ist, intent-based approaches to statutory interpretation.1 4  But Hart
and Wechsler viewed Congress, not the federal courts, as the appro-
8. Compare David Hume, My Own Life, in David Hume, An Inquiry Concerning Human
Understanding 4 (Liberal Arts, 1955) (asserting that no 'literary attempt was more unfortunate
than my Treatise of Human Nature. It fell deadborn from the press.)
9. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
10. See Hart and Wechsler, The Federal Courts at xi (1st ed.) (cited in note 1) (explaining
that "[o]ne of the consequences of our federalism is a legal system that derives from both the
Nation and the States as separate sources of authority and is administered by state and federal
judiciaries, functioning in far more subtle combination than is readily perceived. The resulting
legal problems are the subject of this book.).
11. See, for example, id. at 1083 (referring to the "great principle of intergovernmental
comity*). See also Henry M. Hart, Jr., The Relations Between State and Federal Law, 54 Colum.
L. Rev. 489, 542 (1954) (lauding a federal system that allows spheres of independence and local
experiment as one that "maximizes the opportunities for coping effectively with the problems of
social living).
12. The relationship of Hart and Wechsler and the Legal Process tradition to Legal Realism
has been widely noted. See, for example, Amar, 102 Harv. L. Rev. 688 (cited in note 1); Michael
Wells, Behind the Parity Debate: The Decline of the Legal Process Tradition in the Law of Federal
Courts, 71 B.U. L. Rev. 609 (1991); Gary Peller, Neutral Principles in the 1950's, 21 U. Mich. J. L.
Ref. 561 (1988).
13. See Hart and Wechsler, The Federal Courts at 686-90, 708 (1st ed.) (cited in note 1). See
also Hart, 54 Colum. L. Rev. at 530, 534 (cited in note 11).
14. See Hart and Wechsler, The Federal Courts at 750-51 (1st ed.) (suggesting approval of a
more restrictive interpretation of the statutory provision conferring "arising under" jurisdiction
than Congress apparently intended). The casebook's general stance seems consistent with the
"purposive" approach to statutory interpretation for which Hart and Sacks's Legal Process
materials have become celebrated. See Hart and Sacks, The Legal Process (cited in note 3).
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priate principal agent of change and policy development.,5
Notoriously, they also regarded Congress as having broad powers to
define the limits of federal judicial power and to substitute state for
federal courts.16
The final, main issue addressed by Hart and Wechsler was
"what courts are good for-and are not good for."17 In general, the
editors believed that courts were good at, and indeed essential for,
resolving concrete, narrowly focused disputes. As conceived by Hart
and Wechsler, resolution of properly justiciable controversies was not
a simple or mechanical process; adjudication ideally required a rea-
soned understanding of the surrounding facts and institutions and
called for the formulation of principles of decision that would provide
clear guidelines for future cases.'8 But Hart and Wechsler thought the
courts ill-suited both to decide "polycentric' disputes involving the
clashing interests of a range of litigants's and to develop policy, except
in the interstices of statutory or constitutional commands.
1. The Unmet Challenge of Brown?
From the moment of its publication, the Hart and Wechsler
casebook was hailed as a work of unparalleled creativity and insight.,
Within the field, it has continued to enjoy high esteem over three
editions and more than four decades.2' But why?
To a child of the Warren Court, as many of us in law teaching
now are, the substantive themes of the original Hart and Wechsler
casebook have a vaguely antediluvian aspect.22 Indeed, it may be
puzzling that the forces loosed by the Warren Court in general, and
15. See Amer, 102 Harv. L. Rev. at 698 (cited in note 1) (noting that Hart and Wechsler
viewed the federal courts as having only a "modest role vis-a-vis Congress").
16. That Congress possesses broad power to define the limits of federal jurisdiction is a
recurrent theme of Professor Hart's The Power of Congress to Limit the Jurisdiction of Federal
Courts, 66 Harv. L. Rev. 1362 (1953) ("Dialogue"), reprinted in Hart and Wechsler, The Federal
Courts at 312-40 (lst ed.) (cited in note 1).
17. Hart and Wechsler, The Federal Courts at xii (1st ed.).
18. See, for example, Henry M. Hart, Jr., The Supreme Court 1958 Term-Foreword: The
Time Chart of the Justices, 73 Harv. L. Rev. 84, 99 (1959).
19. See Hart and Sacks, The Legal Process at 686-87 (cited in note 3).
20. See, for example, Philip Kurland, Book Review, The Federal Courts and the Federal
System, 67 Harv. L. Rev. 906 (1954); Paul Mishkin, Book Review, The Federal Courts and the
Federal System, 21 U. Chi. L. Rev. 776 (1954).
21. See, for example, Amar, 102 Harv. L. Rev. at 688 (cited in note 1).
22. Here, and throughout this paragraph, my argument largely tracks that of Akhil Amar.
See id.
958 [47:953
REFLECTIONS ON HART AND WECHSLER
Brown v. Board of Education23 in particular, did not render the book
an immediate anachronism. Throughout the 1950s and 1960s, invo-
cations of "federalism" frequently appeared as apologies for race-based
repression and deprivations of constitutional rights.24 In the domain
of the separation of powers, the federal courts quickly assumed a
larger, more assertive role. Flast v. Cohen5 allowed a taxpayer suit
challenging expenditures voted by Congress. In cases such as Mapp v.
Ohio26 and Mirandd v. Arizona,27 the Supreme Court undertook a
quasi-legislative responsibility for developing a judicially enforceable
code of criminal procedure applicable in state and federal courts alike.
Finally, with respect to Hart and Wechsler's stance on the question of
what courts are good for, the federal judiciary swiftly turned from
desegregating the schools to redistricting state legislatures.28
Despite the controversiality of the Warren Court,29 these
developments had a dual, lasting significance. First, the Warren
Court altered the basic allocations of power in American government
in ways that subsequent Courts have found difficult, if not impossible,
to reverse.-l Second, Brown v. Board of Education, in particular,
emerged as the central, intellectually formative case for a new genera-
tion of lawyers and professors and shaped their basic approach to law
in the way that Lochner v. New York3l and Erie Railroad Co. v.
Tompkins32 had affected the generation of Henry Hart and Herbert
23. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
24. See John Morton Blum, Years of Discord: American Politics and Society, 1961-1974 at
91-98 (Norton, 1991) (noting that Brown "triggered angry reassertions in a new dress of the
antebellum doctine of nullification and states rights" and documenting attempted reliance on
state and local law to thwart the implementation of Supreme Court mandates).
25. 392 U.S. 83 (1968).
26. 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
27. 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
28. For a path-breaking study of how public law litigation required changed assumptions
about the nature of a justiciable case and the judicial role, see Abram Chayes, The Role of the
Judge in Public Law Litigation, 89 Harv. L. Rev. 1281 (1976).
29. Writing in 1970, Alexander Bickel attempted to substantiate the charge that the
Warren Court deserved censure "for erratic subjectivity of judgment, for analytical laxness, for
what amounts to intellectual incoherence in many opinions, and for imagining too much history."
Alexander Bickel, The Supreme Court and the Idea of Progress 45 (Harper & Row, 1970). The
Warren Court did not lack defenders. See, for example, Archibald Cox, The Warren Court:
Constitutional Decision as an Instrument of Reform (Harvard U., 1968); Charles L. Black, Jr., The
Unfinished Business of the Warren Court, 46 Wash. L. Rev. 3 (1970); and J. Skelly Wright,
Professor Bickel, the Scholarly Tradition, and the Supreme Court, 84 Harv. L. Rev. 769 (1971).
30. Even those most critical of Warren Court doctrines acknowledge the claims of stare
decisis. See, for example, Robert H. Bork, The Tempting of America: The Political Seduction of
the Law 155-59 (Free Press, 1990).
31. 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
32. 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
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Wechsler. 3 Yet Brown threatened Hart and Wechsler's substantive
views perhaps more than any other decision. Brown, which inspired
new conceptions of constitutional decisionmaking, reflected the
judiciary in a leadership role, undermining traditions of federalism,
and sliding gradually into the remedial problems of public law
litigation.
By the time of Henry Hart's death in 1969, anyone might have
expected the Hart and Wechsler casebook to be regarded as an arcane
relic of a bygone age. No revised edition had appeared. Perhaps Hart,
the "profound and passionate student and teacher" eulogized in the
dedication to the second edition'4 lacked the requisite sympathy with
the emerging federal system to accept the challenge of rationalizing it
with the same admiring insight he had applied to the old.
2. The Puzzling Persistence of Hart and Wechsler
Amazingly, however, Federal Courts professors throughout the
country continued to teach Hart and Wechsler. Competitors emerged,
but the best scholars continued either to work within the basic organ-
izing structures Hart and Wechsler had employed or, when they took
divergent stances, to treat Hart and Wechsler as having defined a
challenge that needed to be met. Numerous scholars have questioned
and rejected Hart and Wechsler's particular substantive positions.
Indeed, the editors of the second and especially the third edition have
revised the casebook's substantive stance in a number of important
respects.35  But the book retains an unmistakable continuity. The
editors still work in the same conceptual universe as did Henry Hart
and Herbert Wechsler, still ask the same kinds of questions, and still
employ the same basic methodology. So do most of us who teach and
write about Federal Courts issues. This apparent stasis explains why
it is so embarrassingly plausible for outsiders to view Federal Courts
as an intellectual backwater, and so natural for those in the field to
wonder why we cannot develop a more contemporary agenda.
B. Sources of Influence
In thinking about where we are and where we are going, in
contemplating oedipal revolt or paradigm shift, we should begin by
33, See Amar, 102 Harv. L. Rev. at 702-03 (cited in note 1).
34. See Hart and Wechsler, The Federal Courts at xv (2d ed.) (cited in note 1).
35. See Arnar, 102 Harv. L. Rev. at 710-14 (cited in note 1).
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clarifying the nature of Hart and Wechsler's enduring thrall. First,
Hart and Wechsler substantially defined the Federal Courts curricu-
lum as we know it. Second, Hart and Wechsler supplied a "Legal
Process" method of analysis that plays a crucial role in unifying
Federal Courts issues. 36  When these two achievements are put to-
gether, Hart and Wechsler's shadow may prove ubiquitous as long as
Federal Courts continues as the subject that we now put under that
rubric.
1. The Definition of the Federal Courts Field
Virtually every topic or issue within the conventional domain of
a Federal Courts course could easily be assigned to some other subject
in the law school curriculum-Administrative Law, Civil Procedure,
Civil Rights, Conflicts of Laws, Constitutional Law, Constitutional
Interpretation, Criminal Procedure, Injunctions, Remedies, or
Statutory Interpretation, for example. Something similiar is true, I
suppose, of many subjects now taught in American law schools. Even
so, Federal Courts seems an extreme case. The Federal Courts course
characteristically groups together a set of questions that need not be
linked. In fact, these issues were not grouped together until well into
this century-until Hart and Wechsler linked them in The Federal
Courts and the Federal System.3
36. Reflecting their formative influence, scholars often have labelled the characteristic, de-
fining questions of Federal Courts inquiry "Legal Process" questions. Even more than the Hart
and Wechsler casebook, the central text of the Legal Process movement is Hart and Sacks, The
Legal Process (cited in note 3). Valuable secondary works include Amar, 102 Harv. L. Rev. 688
(cited in note 1); William N. Eskridge, Jr. and Philip P. Frickey, Legislation and Pedagogy in the
Post.Legal Process Era, 48 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 691 (1987); Wells, 71 B.U. L. Rev. 609 (cited in note 12);
Vincent A. Wellman, Dworkin and the Legal Process Tradition: The Legacy of Hart and Sacks, 29
Ariz. L. Rev. 413 (1987); G. Edward White, The Evolution of Reasoned Elaboration:
Jurisprudential Criticism and Social Change, 59 Va. L. Rev. 279 (1973).
37. See Mary Brigid McManamon, Felix Frankfurter:. The Architect of "Our Federalism," 27
Ga. L. Rev. 697, 757 (1993) (noting that "[b]efore the 1930s, there were very few schools with a
course on federal jurisdiction and procedure"). See generally Judith Resnik, Dependent
Sovereigns: Indian Tribes, States, and the Federal Courts, 56 U. Chi. L. Rev. 671, 681-83 & n.44
(1989) (discussing early scholarship on the federal courts). The first federal jurisdiction casebook
was not published until 1917, and it, like those that soon followed, principally addressed the
practical details of federal practice and procedure. See McManamon, 27 Ga. L. Rev. at 757-60.
Sophistication of treatment gradually increased, but prior to Hart and Wechsler, nearly all of the
leading casebooks dealt predominantly with issues of federal procedure, rather than allocations of
decision.making authority in the federal system. See id. Exceptions included Harold R. Medina,
Cases on Federal Jurisdiction and Procedure (West, 1926), and, more importantly, two casebooks
edited by Felix Frankfurter: Felix Frankfurter and Wilber G. Katz, eds., Cases and Other
Authorities on Federal Jurisdiction and Procedure (Callaghan, 1931), and Felix Frankfurter and
19941
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As defined by Hart and Wechsler, the central, organizing ques-
tion of Federal Courts doctrine involves allocations of authority: Who
ought to have authority to give conclusive determinations of which
kinds of questions? For example, who should determine the scope of
federal jurisdiction? If Congress has some political discretion, how
much? Which questions should be allocated to state tribunals? Why?
If a particular tribunal is to decide in the first instance only, by whom
should those decisions be reviewed? What standards of review should
apply? When, if ever, can Congress or a state legislature preclude
judicial review or judicial remedies? In the context of a Constitutional
Law course, questions of institutional competence such as these stir
impatience; they may seem to reflect obfuscation, a refusal to address
the merits of hard questions.38 In the Federal Courts course as struc-
tured by Hart and Wechsler, however, there are no other questions-
only these and their practical and methodological corollaries.
Hart and Wechsler linked these questions with a single, con-
trolling insight. Simply stated, authority to decide must at least
sometimes include authority to decide wrongly. This Legal Process
notion is so familiar now that we no longer may be able to conceive of
it as an insight without imaginative effort. But familiarity renders
the idea no less generative. Once the point is recognized, it becomes
evident that constitutional federalism and the separation of powers
can be illuminated by painstaking attention to the question of where
ultimate responsibility for certain kinds of questions, including the
power to make uncorrectable mistakes, should lie. It is entirely possi-
ble, after all, to imagine something called a "Federal Courts" or
"Federal Jurisdiction" course in which quite different questions were
asked. For an example of a different approach, it is necessary only to
notice the alternative conception that Hart and Wechsler explicitly
Harry Shulman, eds., Cases and Other Authorities on Federal Jurisdiction and Procedure
(Callaghan, rev. ed. 1937). These books prefigured Hart and Wechsler by focusing less on
procedure and more on issues of federalism and judicial power and competence. See
McManamon, 27 Ga. L. Rev. at 761-68. When the first edition of Hart and Wechsler came out in
1953, it "was clearly a descendant of Frankfurter's casebook," id. at 769, but an original and
transformative contribution to the field nonetheless. First, Hart and Wechsler were much more
successful than Frankfurter in persuading other Federal Courts teachers and casebook editors to
conceive of 'the course as one about the intellectual issues presented by the federal court system,"
and about federalism in particular, "rather than simply about the procedure of that system." Id.
at 769-70. Second, Hart and Wechsler introduced a distinctive theme involving the necessary role
of courts and remedies in a system of law. For further discussion of this theme, see notes 55-57
and accompanying text.
38. See, for example, Laurence Tribe, The Puzzling Persistence of Process-Based
Constitutional Theories, 89 Yale L. J. 1063 (1980).
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rejected-an advanced course in Civil Procedure.39 Hart and Wechsler
were no more interested in identifying normatively ideal answers to
purely procedural questions (if there are any) than in assessing what
substantive principles of constitutional law should govern the merits
of particular cases after the jurisdiction of a tribunal was estab-
lished.40
In short, to study Federal Courts law as we know it is to work
in a subject area whose definition can be traced directly to Hart and
Wechsler. 41 To reject all reminders of their influence would require
redefinition, if not abandonment, of Federal Courts teaching and
scholarship.
2. Legal Process Methodological Assumptions
In attempting to understand the pervasive influence of Hart
and Wechsler, it is not enough to note that the field is defined by a set
of doctrinal and policy questions that they linked. Taken individually,
most of Hart and Wechsler's doctrinal and policy questions were not
original even in 1953. Similar questions have been raised at least
since Congress addressed the question of how to allocate judicial
power in the first Judiciary Act.42 In addition, Felix Frankfurter had
framed many (although not all) of these questions in the Federal
Jurisdiction casebooks that he edited in the 1930s.4 Indeed, Hart and
39. See Hart and Wechsler, The Federal Courts at xii (1st ed.) (cited in note 1) (observing
that "[t]he study of federal jurisdiction has commonly been coupled with that of federal procedure.
It is uncoupled here."). The procedural emphasis was very strong in what was perhaps the
leading Federal Courts casebook before the publication of Hart and Wechsler's first edition,
Charles T. McCormick and James H. Chadbourn, Cases and Materials on Federal Courts
(Foundation, 2d ed. 1950), as it had been in most of the early works in the field. See note 37
(discussing earlier casebooks).
40. This is not to suggest that Hart and Wechsler were unconcerned with substantive
issues, only that their concern was more wholesale or aggregate-involving the comparative
competence of decisionmakers to reach acceptable decisions in broad categories of cases-than re-
tail or case-specific. For a further discussion of this distinction, see notes 84-94 and accompanying
text.
41. See Amar, 102 Harv. L. Rev. at 690 (cited in note 1).
42. The implications of federal judicial jurisdiction for federalism and the separation of
powers have been recognized throughout American constitutional history. See generally Felix
Frankfurter and James Landis, The Business of the Supreme Court (Macmillan, 1928); William R.
Casto, The First Congress's Understanding of Its Authority Over the Federal Courts' Jurisdiction,
26 B.C. L. Rev. 1001 (1985).
43. See Frankfurter and Shulman, eds., Cases and Other Authorities (cited in note 37);
Frankfurter and Katz, eds., Cases and Other Authorities (cited in note 37).
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Wechsler dedicated the first edition of their casebook to "Felix
Frankfurter, who first opened our eyes to these problems." 44
Pushing beyond Frankfurter's texts, Hart and Wechsler linked
the now-characteristic Federal Courts questions by pioneering a mode
of analysis that exemplifies the Legal Process school.45 I am not a
legal historian, and I cannot pretend to do justice to the complex body
of work sometimes grouped under that rubric.4 But when I read Hart
and Wechsler in conjunction with the Hart and Sacks book,47 from
which the Legal Process school derived its name if not its canon, Hart
and Wechsler's methodological stance seems to reflect at least six
characteristic Legal Process assumptions.
a. The Principle of Institutional Settlement48
Hart and Wechsler assumed a proposition for which the Hart
and Sacks materials later offered detailed argument: questions of
how decision-making authority should be allocated are of foremost
importance.49 In a post-Realist world, legal norms are frequently
indeterminate. Moreover, in a demonstrably pluralistic society, we
cannot expect consensus about appropriate answers to many urgent
questions of substantive justice. But most of us, Hart and Wechsler
assume, are prepared to accept the claim to legitimacy of thoughtful,
deliberative, unbiased decisions by government officials who are rea-
sonably empowered to make such decisions. On this assumption rest
our hopes for the rule of law.
44. Hart and Wechsler, The Federal Courts at ix (lst ed.) (cited in note 1).
45. See Almar, 102 Harv. L. Rev. at 690-91 (cited in note 1); Peller, 21 U. Mich. J. L. Ref. at
566-72 (cited in note 12); Wells, 71 B.U. L. Rev. at 619-29 (cited in note 12).
46. For valuable secondary works, see the sources cited in note 36.
47. Hart and Sacks, The Legal Process (cited in note 3).
48. This principle was so labelled by Hart and Sacks: "The alternative to disintegrating
resort to violence is the establishment of regularized and peaceable methods of decision. The
principle of institutional settlement expresses the judgment that decisions which are the duly
arrived at result of duly established procedures of this kind ought to be accepted as binding on the
whole society unless and until they are duly changed." Id. at 4.
49. Precisely because consensus on substantive outcomes could not be expected, Hart and
Sacks termed procedural understandings, including the allocations of decision-making authority
presupposed by the principle of institutional settlement, 'more fundamental than ... substantive
arrangements." Id. at 3.
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b. The Anti-Positivist Principle
Second, we should understand the "law" bearing on allocations
of institutional responsibility as a rich, fluid, and evolving set of norms
for effective governance and dispute resolution, not as a positivist
system of fixed and determinate rules. ° Any particular legal directive
must be seen and interpreted in light of the whole body of law. 51 More
generally, legal interpretation should be purposive,5 2 not rigid or
mechanical, and the variety of sources of law to which a legal inter-
preter can appeal includes principles and policies as well as canonical
texts.m This principle applies to both constitutional and statutory
interpretation.
c. The Principle of Structural Interpretation
In disputes about the proper allocation of decision-making
authority, the principles and policies underlying federalism and the
separation of powers deserve special weight. But we should under-
stand federalism and the separation of powers themselves in light of a
functional concern to "release to the utmost the enormous potential"M
of myriad private and governmental structures to establish justice and
promote prosperity.
d. The Principle of the Rule of Law
The rule of law implies courts. 55 Although decisions by
Congress and the President enjoy a special democratic legitimacy, and
Congress enjoys a broad competence to allocate jurisdiction among
50. See id. at 101; Henry M. Hart, Jr., Holmes' Positivism-An Addendum, 64 Harv. L. Rev.
929, 930 (1951) (arguing that "a1aw as it is is a continuous process of becoming" and that, since
morality has a role in influencing what law becomes, it is part of what law already is) (emphasis in
original); Wellman, 29 Ariz. L. Rev. at 429-34 (cited in note 36).
Somewhat regrettably, in The Legal Process materials in which the anti-positivist principle is
exposed most fully, "Hart and Sacks specify neither the origin of legal norms nor the source of
their authority.' Wellman, 29 Ariz. L. Rev. at 432.
51. See Hart and Sacks, The Legal Process at 101 (cited in note 3); Wellman, 29 Ariz. L.
Rev. at 459-60,462-65.
52. See Hart and Sacks, The Legal Process at 1157,1415; Wellman, 29 Ariz. L. Rev. at 462-
65.
53. See Hart and Sacks, The Legal Process at 158-60; Wellman, 29 Ariz. L. Rev. at 419-21,
429-34,459-61,462-65.
54. Hart, 54 Colum. L. Rev. at 490 (cited in note 11).
55. See Hart, Dialogue, 66 Harv. L. Rev. at 1372 (cited in note 16).
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tribunals and to establish limits on the judicial role,5 the courts have
irreducible functions. The rule of law also requires the availability of
judicial remedies sufficient to vindicate fundamental legal principles.57
e. The Principle of Reasoned Elaboration
Reason and reasoned elaboration are the stuff of the judicial
process.m When reasons of fairness, prudence, practicality, coherence,
or convenience strongly support a-particular principle, courts should
"use every possible resource of construction"79 to arrive at the result
that is so prescribed. Interstitial crafting of federal common law
comes within the function of reasoned elaboration; so does insistence
that other institutions with frontline decision-making responsibility
follow processes designed to produce substantively sound results. But
while the judicial role is irreducibly creative in some respects, it is
limited to the reasoned elaboration of principles and policies that are
ultimately traceable to more democratically legitimate decisionmak-
ers.
f. The Neutrality Principle
Hart and Wechsler assume that courts must be principled in
their reasoning. 60 Courts are part of a structure of government; they
must respect the prerogatives of other institutions and explain their
decisions in a way that makes the notion of "the rule of law" meaning-
ful.61 Courts should avoid making law or policy out of whole cloth.
They should decline to impose substantive judicial judgments on dis-
putes not capable of resolution through the application of neutral
principles to sharply defined sets of facts.
56. See id. Hart's "Dialogue" was reprinted in the first edition of the Hart and Wechsler
casebook and has been retained, with updated footnotes, in both subsequent editions.
57. See id. at 1386-1402. Although the argument was not always framed in explicitly rule-
of-law terms, the first edition of Hart and Wechsler maintained a drumbeat of criticism against an
excessively broad construction of the sovereign immunity doctrine, which often precludes people
whose rights have been violated from seeking relief from the government. See, for example, Hart
and Wechsler, The Federal Courts at 1151-52, 1156, 1161, 1175-77, 1208, 1230-31 (lst ed.) (cited in
note 1).
58. See Hart and Sacks, The Legal Process at 161, 165-68, 487 (cited in note 3); Peller, 21 U.
Mich. J. L. Ref. at 595 (cited in note 12); White, 59 Va. L. Rev. 279 (cited in note 36).
59. Hart, Dialogue, 66 Harv. L. Rev. at 1399 (cited in note 16).
60. See Herbert Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 73 Harv. L.
Rev. 1 (1959); Hart, 73 Harv. L. Rev. at 99 (cited in note 18); Hart, 54 Colum. L. Rev. at 534 n.179
(cited in note 11).
61. See Hart, 73 Harv. L. Rev. at 99.
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3. The Assumptions' Current Status
Of these six methodological assumptions, the first four, in
particular, continue to provide the framework within which Federal
Courts analysis is predominantly conducted. The first assumption--
involving "the principle of institutional settlement"-seems to me to
be irresistible. As I have suggested already, it comes close to defining
the Federal Courts field all by itself.
Something similar to the second assumption, "the anti-positiv-
ist principle," is needed to explain a number of important Federal
Courts doctrines that are difficult to reconcile with original under-
standings or the framers' intent.6 2 I do not question that very good
reasons exist to adhere to original understandings in many circum-
stances; the principle of institutional settlement assumes as much.6 3
But Federal Courts scholars, as legal scholars generally, need a theory
of law that allows them to reject the reactionary and dysfunctional
thesis that non-originalist decisions and doctrines are somehow not
really "law" at all64
The third assumption, "the principle of structural interpreta-
tion," expresses the widely shared experience that considerations of
federalism and the separation of powers lend thematic unity to
Federal Courts issues.65  Interpretive uncertainties frequently are
resolved by reference to larger conceptions of appropriate relations
among institutions of government.66 The general responsibilities of
62. For an effort, which is very much in the Legal Process tradition, to explain some of
these as reflections of a settled principle recognizing judicial discretion in exercising jurisdiction
conferred by Congress, see David L. Shapiro, Jurisdiction and Discretion, 60 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 543
(1985).
63. Compare Guido Calabresi, A Common Law for the Age of Statutes 1-7, 81-119, 146-81
(Harvard U., 1982) (arguing within the Legal Process tradition that old statutes that would be
unlikely to express the values of contemporary majorities sometimes should be subject to being
identified as obsolescent and therefore inapplicable by courts).
64. Compare Henry Paul Monaghan, The Supreme Court 1974 Term-Foreword:
Constitutional Common Law, 89 Harv. L. Rev. 1, 3 (1975) (arguing that a theory of "constitutional
common law" is necessary to account for a number of legal doctrines that could not be adequately
explained or justified as ordinary constitutional interpretation).
65. For an effort to capture some of the thematic unity in debates about judicial federalism,
see Richard H. Fallon, Jr., The Ideologies of Federal Courts Law, 74 Va. L. Rev. 1141 (1988). See
also Shapiro, 60 N.Y.U. L. Rev. at 580-87 (cited in note 62) (discussing how considerations of
federalism and the separation of powers bear on the discretionary exercise of federal jurisdiction
in a number of contexts).
66. For an interesting commentary on the appropriateness and limits of what he calls
'holistic interpretation," see Daniel J. Meltzer, The History and Structure of Article III, 138 U. Pa.
L. Rev. 1569 (1990).
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state and federal institutions, and the structure of relations between
them, are thus appropriate objects of study. The principle of struc-
tural interpretation also complements the principle of anti-positivism;
if courts should decide interpretive questions in light of the entire
body of law, principles of federalism and the separation of powers
emerge as vital sources of law. Even more important, the principle of
structural interpretation provides the centrifugal force that holds
much of the Federal Courts course together as something other than a
series of isolated episodes of statutory and constitutional interpreta-
tion.67 Conceptions of federalism and the separation of powers become
relevant to, even if not dispositive of, nearly every Federal Courts
problem.
The fourth assumption, "the principle of the rule of law," re-
flects Hart and Wechsler's most important conceptual advance from
the materials on Federal Jurisdiction assembled by Felix Frankfurter
in the 1930s. 68 The principle is vague, but it provides a vital reference
point for debates about such otherwise disparate issues as the scope of
congressional power to limit judicial jurisdiction, the possible necessity
of constitutional remedies under Bivens 9 and other doctrines,10 and
the constitutionally acceptable scope of sovereign and official immu-
nity. Like the principle of structural interpretation, the principle of
the rule of law explains the experience, shared by most students and
teachers, of a centrifugal power that binds otherwise disparate ques-
tions together.71
The fifth assumption, "the principle of reasoned elaboration,"
seems to me to be plausible and attractive once the anti-positivist
67. Compare Akhil Reed Amar, The Two-Tiered Structure of the Judiciary Act of 1789, 138
U. Pa. L. Rev. 1499, 1501 (1990) (observing that "[t]he view of federalism and separation of powers
one articulates in the context of the jurisdiction stripping debate is likely to have important
implications for many other key debates in the field of federal jurisdiction. .).
68. See Frankfurter and Shulman, eds., Cases and Other Authorities (cited in note 37);
Frankfurter and Katz, eds., Cases and Other Authorities (cited in note 37). See also Frankfurter
and Landis, The Business of the Supreme Court (cited in note 42).
69. See Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388
(1971).
70. See generally Richard H. Fallon, Jr. and Daniel J. Meltzer, New Law, Nonretroactivity,
and Constitutional Remedies, 104 Harv. L. Rev. 1731, 1777-91, 1824-30 (1991) (attempting to
develop principles explaining when remedies for constitutional violations are and are not
constitutionally necessary under existing doctrine).
71. My own efforts to link issues involving congressional control of jurisdiction, the
necessary availability of judicial remedies, and judicial review of executive action have been
largely inspired by Hart's incomparable Dialogue. See Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Some Confusions
About Due Process, Judicial Review, and Constitutional Remedies, 93 Colum. L. Rev. 309 (1993);
Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Of Legislative Courts, Administrative Agencies, and Article III, 101 Harv.
L. Rev. 915 (1988); Fallon and Meltzer, 104 Harv. L. Rev. 1731 (cited in note 70).
968 [47:953
REFLECTIONS ON HART AND WECHSLER
principle and the principle of institutional settlement are accepted.
This principle is vague, however, and may lack bite. The sixth, "the
neutrality principle," leads to the much mooted questions of what
constitutes some decisions as principled and others as ad hoc or un-
reasoned and whether the value of principled decisions sometimes
may be outweighed by other values.72 I cannot pause to probe these
questions here. It seems clear, however, that any systematic study of
Federal Courts doctrine would need to explore the nature of principled
decisionmaking" and to assess its importance in comparison with
other values.74
C. The Paradigm Within Which We Work
Hart and Wechsler's definition of Federal Courts inquiry, in
conjunction with their Legal Process methodological assumptions,
constitutes what fairly can be called the Hart and Wechsler para-
digm.7 All of us who teach and write about Federal Courts law may
not accept every one of the Legal Process assumptions that I sketched
above. But we do share the basic definition of the subject matters
that constitute Federal Courts law; we also predominantly accept
Hart and Wechsler's assumptions linking the questions that comprise
the field. It is only against this shared background of assumptions
that we find Hart and Wechsler's substantive positions interesting,
misguided, outdated, or questionable.
In sum, I think we continue to work in the shadow of Hart and
Wechsler, not because they had especially compelling substantive
theories about federalism, or the separation of powers, or what courts
are good for. We work in their shadow because we accept their most
72. See generally Kent Greenawalt, The Enduring Significance of Neutral Principles, 78
Colum. L. Rev. 982 (1978) (exploring these issues and the debates surrounding them).
73. Among the questions deserving attention is whether existing conceptions of neutrality,
principled decisionmaking, and the judicial role reflect implicit biases that might be exposed by
feminist or other critical scholarship. See, for example, Judith Resnik, On the Bias: Feminist
Reconsiderations of the Aspirations for Our Judges, 61 S. Cal. L. Rev. 1877 (1988).
74. For a classic exchange dealing with one corner of this broad issue, compare Alexander
M. Bickel, The Supreme Court, 1960 Term-Foreword: The Passive Virtues, 75 Harv. L. Rev. 40
(1961) (arguing that the Supreme Court need not be principled in its decision of jurisdictional
questions, although it must always decide questions on the merits in a principled way), with
Gerald Gunther, The Subtle Vices of the "Passive Virtues"--A Comment on Principle and
Expediency in Judicial Review, 64 Colum. L. Rev. 1 (1964) (urging that jurisdictional decisions
also must be principled).
75. Compare Amar, 102 Harv. L. Rev. at 711 (cited in note 1) (aruging that "[tihe real
genius of the first edition [of Hart and Wechsler]-its enduring contribution to American law-lay
not in its particular substantive vision, but in its legal process methodology").
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basic questions and assumptions. Federal Courts scholars character-
istically spend their professional lives addressing Legal Process ques-
tions, largely within the Legal Process paradigm that Hart and
Wechsler developed.76
III. A QUALIFIED DEFENSE OF LEGAL PROCESS INQUIRIES
To assert that Federal Courts is paradigmatically a Legal
Process field may do little to dispel, but indeed may tend to nourish,
the notion that oedipal revolt should be the order of the day or that a
paradigm shift is urgently needed. But that conclusion should not
come too hastily. The topics of Federal Courts inquiry have peculiarly
strong links to Legal Process analysis, which retains a claim to respect
as offering a valuable (though by no means uniquely correct) perspec-
tive on the American legal system.
A. The Rise and Decline of the Legal Process School
As a general approach to the study of law, the Legal Process
movement was undoubtedly a creature of the 1950s. By the post-war
era, a rising generation of legal academics had substantially absorbed
the anti-formalist claims of Legal Realism.77 Most, too, had accepted
the worldly view that substantive moral and political philosophy were
wooly, bankrupt disciplines. 78 Yet this same generation, which had
witnessed Nazi tyranny and the rise of Communist totalitarianism,
had an almost palpable need for a theory of the rule of law. 79 The
Legal Process school, with its principle of institutional settlement and
its theories of comparative institutional competences, furnished a
theory of law and provided a structure for distinctively legal analysis;
it substantially addressed the threat of judicial subjectivity introduced
by Legal Realism, but without relying on the metaphysical pretenses
that had brought moral and political philosophy into bad repute. In
76. See Peller, 21 U. Mich. J. L. Ref. at 569 (cited in note 12) (asserting that "the Hart &
Wechsler Federal Courts casebook was (and still is) the paradigm for the Legal Process ap-
proach").
77. See, for example, id. at 567.
78. See John Hart Ely, Democracy and Distrust 53-54 (Harvard U., 1980) (recalling that
"[w]hen I was a lad studying philosophy in the late 1950s, epistemology and logic were all the
rage, and moral and political philosophy were sneered at by kaowledgeables: after all, one
couldn't really reason about ethical issues, could one?") (emphasis in original).
79. See Peller, 21 U. Mich. J. L. Ref. at 579-91 (cited in note 12).
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short, Legal Process analysis responded magnificently to the intellec-
tual and emotional needs of academic lawyers in the 1950s.
Today, however, much has changed. Lawyers trained in other
disciplines-ranging from economics to semiotics-now analyze doc-
trine with techniques that may make Legal Process analysis seem
quaint and old-fashioned by comparison. 8° Moreover, the conviction
has hardened in other fields that questions of substantive justice
cannot be avoided and, what is more, that the resources for resolving
these questions can be found in economic, moral, or political theory.
B. Why Legal Process Now?
If I am correct that Federal Courts teaching and scholarship
continue to be dominated by a Legal Process paradigm that many
other academic areas have abandoned, is the most plausible explana-
tion that Federal Courts teachers are intellectually backward, if not
bankrupt? I do not think so. My analysis has two parts.
1. The Lack of a Better Alternative
First, whatever may be most illuminating for the study of other
subjects, no one has yet advanced a better paradigm for the study of
Federal Courts issues than the Legal Process paradigm pioneered by
Hart and Wechsler. Indeed, to suggest that we should be seeking
another may be to misunderstand the nature of the subject and its
problems as viewed from the perspective of Federal Courts experts. In
the history of science, Thomas Kuhn has argued, new paradigms have
tended to be developed when old paradigms could no longer deal in an
acceptable way with developments in a field.81 I do not believe that
this is the case with Federal Courts law. As I have argued already,
our subject is defined by questions involving the allocation of author-
ity to decide particular kinds of legal questions. We cannot avoid
issues of institutional authority and comparative institutional compe-
tence. Nor, once these questions arise, can most of us imagine how to
answer them without accepting Hart and Wechsler's leading methodo-
logical assumptions.
80. For a useful survey, see Richard A. Posner, The Decline of Law as an Autonomous
Discipline: 1962-1987, 100 Harv. L. Rev. 761 (1987).
81. See Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions at 66-91 (cited in note 5).
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2. "One View of the Cathedral"
Second, quite apart from the way that the Federal Courts field
looks from the inside, the Legal Process approach that we predomi-
nantly pursue is one that deserves to be rooted somewhere in the legal
academy. If an approach to the study of law limited itself to questions
of comparative institutional competence to decide particular kinds of
issues, it would indeed be defective. But as an aspect of the study of
law-as a perspective from which to get "one view of the cathedral"8 2
of American constitutionalism-the Legal Process paradigm is indis-
pensable. The study of the American constitutional system would be
radically impoverished without the insights--partial though they
undoubtedly are--that questions about the appropriate allocation of
decision-making authority and the design of decision-making struc-
tures can generate. 3
C. Objections and Responses
Some scholars, of course, appear to deny even the limited
claims that I have made on behalf of Hart and Wechsler's characteris-
tically Legal Process approach to Federal Courts issues. In particular,
the argument commonly is made that the abstract concepts upon
which Legal Process arguments depend are as indeterminate as sub-
stantive concepts were shown to be by Legal Realism and that, at
bottom, decisions allocating responsibility to one or another institution
or court are nothing but thinly disguised substantive decisions84 This
challenge takes at least three different forms.
Construed in one way, the argument that judgments allocating
decision-making responsibility reflect substantive commitments raises
no real challenge to the Legal Process view as correctly understood.
There is undoubtedly one sense in which decisions about institutional
authority cannot be made intelligently without a view of what would
count as good outcomes. If, for example, federal courts ordinarily
should not be allowed to enjoin state criminal proceedings, it must be
82. Guido Calabresi and A. Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and
Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral, 85 Harv. L. Rev. 1089 (1972).
83. See Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Individual Rights and the Powers of Government, 27 Ga. L.
Rev. 343, 374-82 (1993).
84. See, for example, Peller, 21 U. Mich. J. L. Ref. at 615-16 (cited in note 12); Michael
Wells, Rhetoric and Reality in the Law of Federal Courts: Professor Fallon's Faulty Premise, 6
Const. Comm. 367 (1989); Michael Wells, The Impact of Substantive Interests on the Law of
Federal Courts, 30 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 499 (1989).
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because allowing injunctions would have consequences that should be
adjudged bad in some normative sense. If Congress is allowed to
provide for administrative adjudication, it should be because adminis-
trative adjudication, overall, reasonably can be expected to do more
good than harm from the perspective of constitutional and social
values. But I do not understand the Legal Process school to deny
notions such as these.85 Certainly Henry Hart did not.s As Hart once
85. According to Michael Wells, the Legal Process approach and the principle of reasoned
elaboration in particular presuppose that the values applied by judges must be objectively
identifiable in the sense that they would be recognized as relevant by any professionally compe-
tent judge; a judge's personal values must play no role in adjudication. See Wells, 71 B.U.L. Rev.
at 642 (cited in note 12). Today, Wells argues, the ideal of adjudication that is objective or value-
free in this strong sense can no longer be sustained, and the Legal Process paradigm cannot
survive the collapse of this ideal. See id. I certainly do not deny that the identification of legally
relevant values is frequently an interpretive enterprise that may require contestable moral
judgments. See generally Richard H. Fallon, Jr., A Constructivist Coherence Theory of
Constitutional Interpretation, 100 Harv. L. Rev. 1189 (1987) (discussing the role of moral values in
constitutional interpretation). But it is far from clear that Hart and Wechsler believed value-
neutrality, in the sense demanded by Wells, to be either necessary or possible. As Kent
Greenawalt has noted, even in his celebrated brief for 'Neutral Principles," Herbert Wechsler
'does not contend that judges can decide constitutional cases without weighing conflicting values.
He explicitly recognizes that judges must often make difficult choices among values and does not
suggest that the judge can somehow be neutral among those values.' Greenawalt, 78 Colum. L.
Rev. at 991 (cited in note 72) (footnotes omitted). Whatever Hart and Wechsler may have
thought, I see no reason why contemporary adherents of the Legal Process paradigm cannot
simply acknowledge that legal interpretation sometimes requires contestable value judgments
about which reasonable judges can sometimes disagree. What seems crucial to the notion of
reasoned elaboration is that the value judgments occur within a process of legal reasoning, rather
than being imposed from the outside as a judge's personal, dictatorial preferences. As Wells
recognizes, a sophisticated theory that makes moral judgment internal to legal interpretation is
developed by Ronald Dworkin. Wells, 71 B.U. L. Rev. at 642-43 & n.204 (discussing Ronald
Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously (Harvard U., 1977), and Ronald Dworkin, Law's Empire
(Harvard U., 1986)). Professor Wellman has argued that Dworkin's approach overlaps to a
considerable degree with the Legal Process methodology developed by Hart and Sacks in The
Legal Process (cited in note 3). Wellman, 29 Ariz. L. Rev. 413 (cited in note 36). Modern adher-
ents of the Hart and Wechsler paradigm as I have described it easily could accept a jurispruden-
tial theory in which sometimes contestable value judgments are recognized as an aspect of legal
interpretation.
86. But see Wells, 71 B.U. L. Rev. at 627 (arguing that the "substantive implications of
jurisdictional rules are unimportant in the Hart and Wechsler framework because ideally there
are none'). Wells's interpretation ignores Henry Hart's explicit professions to the contrary. See,
for example, text accompanying note 87. It also fails to reckon with Hart and Wechsler's positions
on particular jurisdictional issues. For example, Hart and Wechsler developed the concept of
"protective jurisdiction" to protect federal interests against state court discrimination even in
cases not formally turning on questions of federal law. See Hart and Wechsler, The Federal
Courts at 745-46 (Ist ed.) (cited in note 1). In their generally hospitable stance toward
administrative adjudication, they surely grasped the point that Congress frequently assigned
adjudicative responsibilities to agencies, rather than to courts, in order to promote more pro-
plaintiff and pro-regulatory outcomes. See, for example, Hart, Dialogue, 66 Harv. L. Rev. at 1384
(cited in note 16) (noting that administrative agencies frequently are established to be the
"champion" of 'the protected groups in an administrative program' and suggesting that it reflects
"a recognition of the equities of the situation" when those groups lose judicially cognizable
VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW
asserted, "you could not think straight about law unless you thought
about its purposes and took sides on hard questions about which
purposes should be furthered and which not."87 The best Legal
Process scholarship continues to consider issues of how to get the
"best" performances from various institutions of government,
including courts.8
Second, and more challengingly, some critics suggest that
determinations about decision-making authority necessarily reflect
concealed substantive judgments on the merits of the particular cases
in which they are rendered.89  Although this argument contains a
germ of truth, it is much overstated. At the margin, Legal Process
questions such as whether a decisionmaker has exceeded her jurisdic-
tion, or whether a party has had a "full and fair" opportunity to liti-
gate her claim, may require a judicial peek at the merits to determine
whether the challenged judgment was one that a reasonable deci-
sionmaker could have made.90 But the determination, even in cases of
this kind, is not whether the institution with frontline decision-mak-
ing authority decided "rightly," but only whether its decision satisfies
some standard of reasonableness. There is a crucial difference. To
deny this difference is to impute judicial responsibility for the correct-
ness of every application of law to fact by every decision-maker whose
judgments are subjected to judicial challenge. Yet to conceive that
judges might possess or accept this responsibility is to indulge a fan-
tasy. Although the line between norms allocating decisional authority
and norms defining substantive rights sometimes may blur, the Legal
Process approach correctly assumes that there are clear cases.
Moreover, at its best, the Legal Process methodology contributes the
most in exposing what is at stake in cases in which the line is fine,
blurry, and even vanishing--for example, when reasoned elaboration
"procedural and litigating rights" and must instead "stand or fall" with the agency's determina-
tions). Indeed, Hart was the initial proponent of the thesis that constitutional claims initially
litigated in state courts might justifiably be relitigated on federal habeas corpus "on the principle
that a state prisoner ought to have an opportunity for a hearing on a federal constitutional claim
in a federal constitutional court." See Hart, 73 Harv. L. Rev. at 106-07 (cited in note 18).
87. Henry M. Hart, Jr., Thomas Reed Powell, 69 Harv. L. Rev. 804,804 (1956).
88. To cite just one example, the question of how best to use state courts as a resource to
ensure maximally effective protection of federal rights is a recurring theme in the work of Ann
Althouse. See, for example, Ann Althouse, Tapping the State Court Resource, 44 Vand. L. Rev.
953 (1991); Ann Althouse, How to Build a Separate Sphere: Federal Courts and State Power, 100
Harv. L. Rev. 1485 (1987).
89. See Peller, 21 U. Mich. J. L. Ref. at 615-16 (cited in note 12).
90. See id.
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shades into policymaking or substitution of substantive moral judg-
ment.
Third, critics sometimes contend that Federal Courts law has
no integrity-that judges routinely manipulate jurisdictional doctrines
in order to arrive at whatever substantive outcomes they happen to
prefer.91 Certainly, manipulation of this kind sometimes occurs. But
the strong form of the hypothesis-that Federal Courts doctrine does
not matter at all---is transparently false.9 2 And any weaker form is
much less threatening to the Legal Process paradigm. Legal Process
scholars could not sensibly claim to model judicial reasoning or predict
the outcome in every case; debates about the extent of the paradigm's
illuminating and predictive powers should be welcome. A threat
would of course re-emerge if it were suggested that some other model
had greater explanatory power3---for example, a model suggesting
that judges regularly manipulate jurisdictional doctrine to promote
their preferred substantive outcomes in each individual case. But this
suggestion at least approaches the strong claim that doctrine has no
constraining force, and the strong claim is impossible to sustain in its
bald form. 94 There is not much space in which to build a plausible
alternative model.
A final, important argument against the Legal Process school
dismisses its approach as apologetic and complacent: the Legal
Process methodology tends to assume the moral legitimacy of the
status quo, to worry less about the desirability of reform than about
institutional competence to effect change, and generally to idealize
91. See Wells, 6 Const. Comm. at 372-81 (cited in note 84); Wells, 30 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. at
636-41 (cited in note 84).
92. Significantly, I do not understand Professor Michael Wells, who is the most prominent
proponent of the thesis that "substantive factors exert a powerful and often unrecognized
influence over the resolution of jurisdictional issues," Wells, 30 Win. & Mary L. Rev. at 499, to
make this claim. Wells maintains instead that the Supreme Court characteristically crafts
jurisdictional doctrine-which thereafter does exert a significant influence on outcomes-with the
hope or expectation of providing a litigating advantage to representatives of preferred substantive
interests in the relevant category of cases. See id. at 506.07 (distinguishing the acknowledged ef-
fect of jurisdictional rules from the motivations that lie behind them). In other words, Wells offers
what I describe as a "weaker" form of the argument that judges routinely manipulate Federal
Courts doctrine to promote preferred substantive ends.
93. Even if some other model did have greater descriptive power, this fact would not be
fatal to the normative claims of the Legal Process school. According to the "weaker" form of
challenge now under discussion, the Legal Process approach is acknowledged to have a foothold in
existing practice that might be expanded as well as contracted.
94. See, for example, Richard H. Fallon, Jr., What Is Republicanism, and Is It Worth
Reviving?, 102 Harv. L. Rev. 1695, 1711-13 (1989) (criticizing the assumptions on which the claim
that doctrine has no constraining force would apparently need to depend).
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elite institutions.95 I regard this charge as at least partly accurate,
and it helps to persuade me that the Legal Process approach cannot
tell us everything we should want to know about how the legal system
either does or should operate. Questions of substantive justice de-
serve attention, not deflection. In identifying the starting point for
legal analysis, we partly define ourselves and our moral stances on
basic issues."" Nevertheless, even a theory of justice requires author-
ity-allocating as well as substantive norms.9 7 If judges should some-
times push the outer limits of their power to reach substantively just
results, they should by no means cease to worry about the sensible
and legitimate boundaries of their own authority.98
In sum, if anyone takes a holistic approach to legal scholarship,
I think those of us in the Federal Courts field, by following what is
basically a Legal Process approach, are doing our fair share to illumi-
nate the American legal system. We need not apologize either to our
students or to our colleagues. If Federal Courts is a scholarly backwa-
ter, it is a backwater with an important place in the ecosystem of
public law scholarship29
IV. DIRECTIONS FOR FUTURE SCHOLARSHIP
So far I have offered a somewhat static thesis about what we
predominantly do in teaching and writing about Federal Courts doc-
trine. I have not said much, except possibly by implication, about the
actual or desirable directions of future scholarship either within or
without the Hart and Wechsler paradigm. I address questions about
what we ought to do with some reticence, for my own standards for
worthwhile scholarship are rather catholic, and I often admire work
that I scarcely could have imagined before I encountered it. With
95. See, for example, Peller, 21 U. Mich J. L. Ref. at 620-21 (cited in note 12); Richard
Davies Parker, The Past of Constitutional Theory-And Its Future, 42 Ohio St. L. J. 223, 252-57
(1981).
96. See J. M. Balkin, Understanding Legal Understanding The Legal Subject and the
Problem of Legal Coherence, 103 Yale L. J. 105, 144-76 (1993).
97. See, for example, John Rawls, A Theory of Justice 195-201, 221-43 (Harvard U., 1971).
98. Compare Frederick Schauer, Rules and the Rules of Law, 14 Harv. J. L. & Pub. Pol. 645,
674-79 (1991) (endorsing the "presumptive positivistV view that courts typically do and should
accept the dictates of existing rules and convention, unless doing so would conflict seriously with
values of supervening importance).
99. Nor is it as disconnected with contemporary thought in other fields as sometimes
believed. See, for example, Wellman, 29 Ariz. L. Rev. at 467-74 (cited in note 36) (noting
continuities between the Legal Process thought of Hart and Sacks and the jurisprudential
theories of Ronald Dworkin).
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trepidation, however, I shall offer some thoughts about possible future
directions of Federal Courts scholarship in three general and overlap-
ping categories: (i) work that occurs within the Hart and Wechsler
paradigm, (ii) work that seeks to reshape that paradigm or create a
sub-paradigm within it, and (iii) work that attempts to debunk or
overthrow the Hart and Wechsler paradigm.
A. Within the Hart and Wechsler Paradigm
An enormous amount of valuable work can be done within the
tradition pioneered by Hart and Wechsler. A partial list of tasks that
Federal Courts scholars can usefully pursue, reflecting my effort to
categorize scholarship that I admire, would include the following: (i)
historical research, (ii) critical analysis of cases and doctrines, (iii)
proposals for law reform, (iv) efforts to identify immanent values or
purposes in light of which bodies of law might be rationalized, (v)
depictions of unrecognized patterns or doctrinal failures to treat
similar problems similarly, and (vi) development of clarifying models
or analytically useful concepts or distinctions. I would single out two
kinds of work for special mention.
1. In Praise of Empirical and Political Scientific Research
The first is empirical and political scientific research. The
characteristic reasoning of the original Hart and Wechsler casebook
could be described as semi-conceptualist. What I have called "the
principle of structural reasoning" assumes that concepts such as fed-
eralism, the separation of powers, and administrative expertise should
have implications for the allocation of decision-making responsibility.
As a matter of intellectual first principle, Hart and Wechsler accepted
the idea that large abstractions such as these needed to be understood
purposively and contextually-in such a way as to, in Hart's words,
"release to the utmost the enormous potential of the human abilities"
in the society.100 But judgments reached on purposive and substantive
grounds--for example, the judgment that the states should be accord-
ed a broad and sympathetic opportunity to experiment with regula-
tory structures--have a tendency, even in Hart and Weschler's hands,
100. Hart, 54 Colum. L. Rev. at 490 (cited in note 11).
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to ossify into neutral principles commanding broad federal judicial
deference to state institutions.
The clear antidote to excessively conceptual analysis is empiri-
cal research. Sensible judgments about how to allocate decision-mak-
ing power require some sense of the actual competence of existing
institutions to make particular kinds of decisions in socially acceptable
ways. In considering allocations of decisional responsibility between
federal courts and other institutions of state and federal government,
most of us could profit from closer attention to more statistical analy-
ses,101 more sociological examinations of decision-making environ-
ments in different kinds of institutions, 10 2 and more case studies aimed
at exploring the actual impact of judicial decisions and decrees of
various kinds.ca I do not mean to imply that no work of this kind
currently is done. Some is, and much of it is excellent.104 Nonetheless,
I think that more of us should take Hart and Wechsler's question of
what courts are and are not good for out into the field, and those of us
who continue to work semi-conceptually should pay more heed to the
researchers' results. Far too many of us have been too content with
speculative, armchair empiricism.
2. The Changing Face of the Federal Judicial Landscape
A closely related kind of work also deserves mention. Even a
small amount of empirical investigation reveals that both the struc-
ture and functions of the judicial branch are subject to change.
Magistrate judges and administrative law judges now do much adju-
dicative work in the federal system.0 5 Judges preside over staffs of
law clerks, who do much of their writing. °6 In addition, judges fre-
101. Examples of this genre include Richard Faust, Tina J. Rubenstein, and Larry W. Yackle,
The Great Writ in Action: Empirical Light on the Federal Habeas Corpus Debate, 18 N.Y.U. Rev.
L. & Soc. Change 637 (1990-1991); Theodore Eisenberg and Stewart Schwab, The Reality of
Constitutional Tort Litigation, 72 Cornell L. Rev. 641 (1987); David L. Shapiro, Federal Habeas
Corpus: A Study in Massachusetts, 87 Harv. L. Rev. 321 (1973).
102. One such study is Jerry L. Mashaw, Bureaucratic Justice: Managing Social Security
Disability Claims (Yale U., 1983).
103. A recent notorious example is Gerald N. Rosenbery, The Hollow Hope: Can Courts
Bring About Social Change? (U. of Chicago, 1991).
104. For critical reviews of some of the relevant literature, see Peter H. Schuck, Public Law
Litigation and Social Reform, 102 Yale L. J. 1763 (1993).
105. See, for example, Judith Resnik, Tiers, 57 S. Cal. L. Rev. 837, 946-47, 974-1005 (1984);
Lauren K. Robel, Caseload and Judging: Judicial Adaptations to Caseload, 1990 B.Y.U. L. Rev.
3,34-36.
106. See Henry Paul Monaghan, Book Review, Taking Bureaucracy Seriously, 99 Harv. L.
Rev. 344, 345 (1985) (arguing that "[t]he litigation explosion carries with it the increasing
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quently take leading roles in pushing parties to enter settlements.10 7
Again, I do not mean to imply that scholars have entirely ignored
these developments. As a group, however, we in the Federal Courts
field have not yet thought carefully enough about how developments
such as these bear on traditional conceptions of the judicial process
and on issues of appropriate allocation of decision-making authority.
B. Work That Seeks to Reshape the Hart and Wechsler Paradigm or
Create a Sub-Paradigm Within It
1. Amar's Neo-Federalism
My claim that Hart and Wechsler created the dominant para-
digm for Federal Courts scholarship is almost necessarily vague and,
to some extent, even metaphorical. Admittedly, no sharp lines sepa-
rate work that occurs within the paradigm from work that either
enriches or alters it or work that establishes closely analogous yet
distinct paradigms. On the one hand, someone can disagree with Hart
and Wechsler about a substantive issue, or even about one of their
central methodological assumptions, without attempting to transform
general understandings of the field. On the other hand, some argu-
ments, if accepted, would have potential implications that could be
worked out for a broad range of issues. Akhil Amar's arguments fur-
nish a case in point.
Amar's "neo-federalist" position, as sketched in a number of
important articles, 108 seems to accept Hart and Wechsler's definition of
the field and most, if not all, of their methodological assumptions.
Nonetheless, his substantive views about federalism, the separation of
powers, and the rule of law are sufficiently deep, plausible, and inter-
connected that it is possible to imagine a school of Amar disciples,
developing the applications of his views for a number of issues, who
bureaucratization of the federal appellate process, a development that severely undermines the
institutional premises' of traditional Legal Process arguments about comparative institutional
competence).
107. See, for example, Peter H. Schuck, Agent Orange on Trial: Mass Toxic Disasters in the
Courts 111-67 (Harvard U., 1986) (describing Judge Jack Weinstein's aggressive role in reaching a
settlement in the Agent Orange litigation); Judith Resnik, Managerial Judges, 96 Harv. L. Rev.
374, 386-90 (1982); Chayes, 89 Harv. L. Rev. at 1298-1302 (cited in note 28).
108. See, for example, Amar, 138 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1499 (cited in note 67); Akhil Reed Amar, A
Neo.Federalist View of Article IIf. Separating the Two Tiers of Federal Jurisdiction, 65 B.U. L.
Rev. 205 (1985); Akhil Reed Amer, Of Sovereignty and Federalism, 96 Yale L. J. 1425 (1987).
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would operate within a set of substantive assumptions that could
plausibly be viewed as constituting a distinct paradigm spun off from
Hart and Wechsler's. This would be a paradigm in a lower-order
sense than I generally have used the term, for the ongoing debate
about the validity of the spun-off paradigm's substantive tenets would
occur within a generally shared set of methodological assumptions
associated with Hart and Wechsler. In any event, Amar has demon-
strated-if demonstration were needed-that the opportunity exists
for doing creative, generative, and even inspiring work without dis-
placing Hart and Wechsler's Legal Process questions and methodol-
ogy.
2. Toward a Theory of Intertemporal Synthesis
I cannot pretend to foresee what lines of thought and research
might lead to scholarship of comparable importance. (If my imagina-
tion were better, my own work would be far more impressive than it
is.) But I would call attention to one large, recurring problem for
those who study, use, apply, and make Federal Courts doctrine, the
theoretical solution to which would have very broad repercussions.
This problem, which Bruce Ackerman's recent work on consti-
tutional history has richly illuminated,1°9 involves difficulties of what
he calls intertemporal synthesis.110 American constitutional and juris-
dictional law exhibit the towering influence of three eras of lawmak-
ing. The first surrounds the framing of the Constitution and, espe-
cially in the First Judiciary Act, the congruent effort to create a juris-
dictional structure for the new republic,,, In general terms, the ani-
mating vision of the founding era regarded the federal government as
appropriately subject to far more constitutional restraints than the
states.112 The Civil War and Reconstruction represent a second forma-
tive era. The Civil War amendments wrought profound changes in
substantive federalism;" 3 at the same time, a spate of jurisdictional
statutes reflected skepticism about the adequacy of state courts to
109. See Bruce Ackerman, 1 We the People: Foundations (Belknap, 1991).
110. See id. at 131-62.
111. For discussion of the 1789 Judiciary Act, see, for example, Frankfurter and Landis, The
Business of the Supreme Court (cited in note 42); Casto, 26 B.C. L. Rev. 1001 (cited in note 42);
Amar, 138 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1499 (cited in note 67).
112. See, for example, Barron v. Baltimore, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 243 (1833) (finding the Bill of
Rights inapplicable to the states).
113. See, for example, Ackerman, 1 We the People at 44-47, 81-83 (cited in note 109).
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protect national rights and interests. 114 Finally, as Ackerman main-
tains, the constitutional order was profoundly altered during the New
Deal era.1 15 Previously recognized restrictions on Congress's legisla-
tive power gave way. More or less contemporaneously, the bridge was
crossed into the modern administrative state, in which federal agen-
cies perform a mix of functions that notably includes adjudication.1 6
Like the founding and Reconstruction, the New Deal and its after-
math witnessed a surge of statutes redefining the lines between the
federal courts and other organs of federal and state government.117
The intertemporal problem, as Ackerman frames it, is one of
figuring out how to integrate the lawmaking of the different eras into
a coherent, workable whole. To pick on Hart and Wechsler, the edi-
tors of the first edition seemed to assume that materials from the
framing era should guide judicial decisionmaking on questions of
judicial federalism. Professor Hart, for example, staked his claim that
state courts enjoy constitutional parity with lower federal courts
largely on the debates about Article III at the Constitutional
Convention.118 On the whole, Reconstruction seems to have been
poorly integrated into Hart and Wechsler's substantive vision. In any
event, in contrast with their reliance on the lawmaking of the framing
era to answer questions of judicial federalism, Hart and Wechsler
seemed largely uninterested in original history when examining ques-
tions about the permissibility of administrative adjudication and
related questions about the administrative state ushered in by the
New Deal.
Problems of intertemporal synthesis are pervasive in the field.
Consider, for example, the familiar debates about how to interpret
post-Civil War jurisdictional legislation that rather clearly exhibited
at least some skepticism about the adequacy of state courts to protect
114. For useful overviews, see Steven Kutler, Judicial Power and Reconstruction Politics (U.
of Chicago, 1968); William Wiecek, The Reconstruction of Federal Judicial Power, 1863-1875, 13
Am. J. Legal Hist. 333 (1969).
115. See Ackerman, 1 We the People at 44-57, 100-30 (cited in note 109).
116. See, for example, Cass R. Sunstein, Constitutionalism After the New Deal, 101 Harv. L.
Rev. 421, 430-46 (1987).
117. See id. at 437-46.
118. See Hart and Wechsler, The Federal Courts at 18 (1st ed.) (cited in note 1) (noting that
"[i]t seems to be a necessary inference from the express decision [at the Constitutional
Convention] that the creation of inferior federal courts was to rest in the discretion of Congress
that the scope of their jurisdiction, once created, was also to be discretionary"); Hart, Dialogue, 66
Harv. L. Rev. at 1363, 1401 (cited in note 16).
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federal rights and interests.119 How should that legislation be inte-
grated with earlier legislation and with entrenched doctrines that
established norms of deference to state courts, state institutions, and
state officials? I think many, if not most, Federal Courts teachers
tend to vary the assumptions that they use in interpreting the rele-
vant statutes and identifying their underlying purposes. For example,
many of us assume that some aspects of the Younger120 doctrine 12' are
incompatible with congressional intent;1 22 Congress distrusted state
courts and state agencies, we reason, and courts should treat Section
1983's23 authorization of injunctive relief as some form of command.1 24
Yet many of us also assume that Congress could not have intended
Section 1983 to be taken literally in all contexts--that it should not be
read to strip judges of their traditional common-law immunity, for
example-because if Congress had wanted to change the law so fun-
damentally, it surely would have said so.1 25
For me the puzzle is both clear and general. Reconstruction
lawmaking must be treated as working large changes in judicial fed-
eralism, but reading the legislation to bury the traces of the prior
structure would spawn chaos. 126 How then should we draw interpre-
119. For an overview, see Fallon, 74 Va. L. Rev. 1141 (cited in note 65).
120. Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971).
121. Although Younger itself involved only a restriction on federal injunctions against state
court proceedings, the Supreme Court has extended its rationale of comity and federalism to bar
federal injunctions against civil enforcement actions to which the state is a party, see Moore v.
Sims, 442 U.S. 415 (1979); to suits between private parties involving the state's interest in the en-
forcement of its judgments, see Texaco v. Pennzoil, 481 U.S. 1 (1987); to state administrative
proceedings that are judicial in nature or closely associated with judicial processes, see Middlesex
County Ethics Comm. v. Garden State Bar Ass'n, 457 U.S. 23 (1982); and to suits to restrain
allegedly unconstitutional patterns of conduct by state police and prosecutors, see Rizzo v. Goode,
423 U.S. 362 (1976).
122. See, for example, John Ziegler, A Reconsideration of the Younger Doctrine in Light of
the Legislative History of Reconstruction, 1983 Duke L. J. 987; Gene R. Nichol, Federalism, State
Courts, and Section 1983,73 Va. L. Rev. 959 (1987); Aviam Soifer and H.C. Macgill, The Younger
Doctrine: Reconstructing Reconstruction, 55 Tex. L. Rev. 1141 (1977); Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Of
Justiciability, Remedies, and Public Law Litigation: Notes on the Jurisprudence of Lyons, 59
N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1 (1984).
123. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1988).
124. See, for example, Ziegler, 1983 Duke L. J. at 1017-25 (cited in note 122); Martin H.
Redish, Abstention, Separation of Powers, and the Limits of the Federal Judicial Function, 94
Yale L. J. 71, 84-89 (1984).
125. The Supreme Court has taken this approach consistently. See, for example, City of
Newport v. Fact Concerts, 453 U.S. 247,258 (1981) (assuming that "members of the 42nd Congress
were familiar with common law principles, including defenses recognized in ordinary tort
litigation, and they likely intended these common law principles to obtain, absent specific
provision to the contrary"). Few commentators have objected to the notion that some form of im-
munity should be recognized despite the absolute terms in which § 1983 is written.
126. See Fallon, 74 Va. L. Rev. at 1224-44 (cited in note 65).
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tive lines? Are we justified in appealing to the intent of a Congress of
a past historical era to support our arguments on some issues if we
are unwilling to do so consistently? A single example may sharpen
the question. Historical evidence suggests that Congress, in enacting
the statute providing for general federal question jurisdiction in
1875,127 intended the jurisdiction to sweep as far as the Constitution
would permit. 12  Not many of us would argue today that the courts
should accept this congressional intent as binding.1'2 9 But if not, how
does this case differ from one in which we do think that congressional
intent ought to control?
Perhaps these are just the ordinary questions about how courts
should interpret the Constitution and how they should interpret
statutes. But Ackerman may be on to something deeper. Statutes,
constitutional provisions, and adjudication all reflect assumptions.
Although it would be simplistic to assume that uniform assumptions
prevail in any particular age, the variance across eras is likely to be
even larger. Questions of intertemporal synthesis then arise. The
development of a methodologically coherent approach to questions of
this kind would make an enormous contribution.
C. Paradigm-Smashing and Paradigm-Making Scholarship
I come finally to possible directions of scholarship challenging
head-on, with the aim of displacing, the Hart and Wechsler paradigm.
It is certainly possible that some strong and imaginative theorist
might, with a single book or article, simultaneously overthrow and
replace Hart and Wechsler. Though unable to develop even a glimmer
of how it might be done, I acknowledge again the all-too-plain limits of
my own imagination.
I can think of only slightly more to say about two other ave-
nues open to those who find the Hart and Wechsler paradigm some-
how stultifying. One obvious direction for the bold and challenging of
spirit would be to mount a frontal assault, specifically within the
Federal Courts domain as conventionally defined, on Hart and
Wechsler's Legal Process methodology. Scholars in other subject
127. Judicary Act of 1875, 18 Stat. 470, codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (1988).
128. See, for example, Ray Forrester, The Nature of a "Federal Question," 16 Tulane L. Rev.
362, 374-75 (1942) (discussing the relevant materials and drawing this conclusion).
129. See Shapiro, 60 N.Y.U. L. Rev. at 568 (cited in note 62) (noting the "accepted wisdom...
that the statute cannot and should not be so construed; otherwise the federal courts would be in-
undated with cases that might better be resolved elsewhere").
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areas have assaulted Legal Process approaches, with the sharpest
challenges coming from the Critical Legal Studies130 and Law and
Economics13' movements. But surprisingly little explicitly Federal
Courts scholarship has devoted itself to challenging, deriding, or
mocking Legal Process assumptions.3 2  Although Gary Peller and
Mark Tushnet are both associated with the Critical Legal Studies
movement, most of their Federal Courts scholarship has accepted the
methodological assumptions of the Legal Process school and has
offered familiar arguments to attack particular doctrines or
positions.33
By similar token, the Law and Economics scholarship within
the Federal Courts field has tended to be surprisingly gentle in its
criticism of Legal Process methodology. 134 Nor has there been much
feminist scholarship addressed to Federal Courts issues. 35  I have
suggested that the Legal Process approach exemplified by Hart and
Wechsler offers a partial, but nonetheless valuable, perspective on
public law issues and that the Federal Courts field is an appropriate
place for this perspective to be represented. If others tentatively are
disposed to agree with this, it is conceivable that we all might be
forced to change our minds if the challenge to Legal Process methodol-
ogy were persistently and persuasively pressed within our subject
area. If so, a genuine methodological crisis would ensue. Nothing
could be better calculated to concentrate the best available minds
than a suddenly urgent question of how to create a workable intellec-
tual order out of what had been unmasked as confusion.
130. See generally Mark G. Kelnan, Trashing, 36 Stan. L. Rev. 293 (1984) (explaining and
justifying the "trashing" of conventional doctrine and scholarship as a scholarly project).
131. For a lucid introduction to the challenges posed to traditional thought about public law
by the "public choice theory" branch of the Law and Economics movement, see Daniel A. Farber
and Philip P. Frickey, Law and Public Choice: A Critical Introduction (U. of Chicago, 1991).
132. Compare Kelman, 36 Stan. L. Rev. at 319-20 & n.65 (cited in note 130) (implying that it
is difficult even "to find some argument worth destroying in the standard public law side of the
Legal Process school," and particularly in Federal Courts scholarship).
133. But see Peller, 21 U. Mich. J. L. Ref. at 612-17 (cited in note 12) (using Federal Courts
examples to argue that the Legal Process method inevitably fails to meet its own criteria of
successful application). Somewhat ironically, Michael Wells is perhaps the Federal Courts field's
leading exponent of the law-is-politics view often associated with Critical Legal Studies. See, for
example, Wells, 71 B.U. L. Rev. 609 (cited in note 12); Wells, 6 Const. Comm. 367 (cited in note
84); Wells, 30 Win. & Mary L. Rev. 499 (cited in note 84). Despite this substantive outlook, Wells's
methodology is traditional, and he claims no association with the Critical Legal Studies move-
ment.
134. See, for example, Richard A. Posner, The Federal Courts: Crisis and Reform 288-89
(Harvard U., 1985).
135. Important exceptions include Judith Resnik, "Naturally" Without Gender Women,
Jurisdiction, and the Federal Courts, 66 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1682 (1991), and Resnik, 61 S. Cal. L. Rev.
1877 (cited in note 73).
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Another possible line of approach follows from my argument
that Hart and Wechsler's continuing influence seems all but inescap-
able given that their questions and methodology largely defined the
Federal Courts field as we now recognize it. It is hard for me to imag-
ine how someone might ask deeper questions about, or develop a
better methodology to study, a set of doctrines linked by Hart and
Wechsler's questions. It is much easier to imagine that someone
might group sets of questions, including many now within the stan-
dard Federal Courts curriculum, in ways that would generate as much
insight as the current arrangement. The next Hart and Wechsler may
be a work about Remedies,136 Federalism, Local Government Law,
Civil Rights Litigation,1 7 or Bureaucracy. The challenge would be to
match questions and methods of inquiry to subject matter, and thus to
define or redefine what a field is about, in the way that Hart and
Wechsler did with Federal Courts.
V. CONCLUSION
I began with the question whether frustration with the Hart
and Wechsler model of Federal Courts scholarship reflected mere
oedipal resentment or signalled the approach of a Kuhnian paradigm
shift. Now, at the end, I am not sure whether my musings add up to
an answer. Having attempted to explicate the Hart and Wechsler
paradigm sympathetically, I have persuaded myself that develop-
ments in the Federal Courts field have not overtaken that paradigm
or rendered it obsolete. In this sense, no paradigm shift seems ur-
gently necessary. Moreover, no successor has yet been proposed with
a plausible claim to allegiance.
On the other hand, the truest and deepest kind of innovation is
inherently unpredictable. For this reason, neither I nor anyone else
can say with assurance that the day of successful revolution is not at
hand. In addition, I have recognized that criticism of the reigning
paradigm is a useful corrective to its partiality and sometime compla-
cency.
136. Compare Owen Fiss, The Civil Rights Injunction (Indiana U., 1978); Owen Fiss,
Injunctions (Foundation, 1972).
137. Compare Peter Low and John Jeffiries, Civil Rights Actions: Section 1983 and Related
Statutes (Foundation, 1988).
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For myself, persuaded that being a Legal Process scholar is not
a terrible occupation, I would be disposed to look rather carefully
before rushing to join in any purported methodological revolution in
Federal Courts scholarship. But choice of a scholarly and pedagogical
mode is almost necessarily a matter of temperament and taste. A
multitude of voices frequently enriches conversation. Others must
decide for themselves.
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APPENDIX
FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM
Professor Fallon, Fall 1993, Four Credit Hours
Syllabus and Assignment List
Unless otherwise indicated, assigned reading is from Hart &
Wechsler's The Federal Courts and the Federal System (3d ed. 1988).
Some assignments also include readings from the 1993 Supplement to
Hart & Wechsler ("Supp.") and from a set of photocopied materials
("Materials") available in the Distribution Center.
Unless otherwise advised, please prepare one assignment for
each class. Problems included in the Materials are likely to be vehi-
cles for class discussion. Please try to find time to consider how other
assigned materials bear on the problems before you come to class.
I. CONGRESSIONAL CONTROL OVER JURISDICTION
A. Jurisdiction of the Federal Courts
1. Scope of Congressional Power
Assignment #1: Problems la-d, Materials pp. 1-
2; U.S. Const., Art. III; pp. 1-2, 10-11, 18-20;
362-70; 376-87; Supp. pp. 57-60; Materials pp. 3-
5 ("Historical Limits")
Assignment #2: Problems 2a-b, Materials pp. 6-
7; pp. 370-76; 1108-10 n.3; 393-99; Materials pp.
8-19 ("Constitutional Remedies")
2. Adjudication by Administrative Agencies and
Related Problems
Assignment #3: Problems 3a-b, Materials pp. 20-
21; pp. 387-93; 399-411; Supp. pp. 61-62;
Materials pp. 22-24 (U.S. v. Mendoza-Lopez)
3. Legislative Courts
Assignment #4. pp. 425-53
Assignment #5. Problem 5, Materials p. 25; pp.
454-73; Supp. pp. 62-66
B. Federal Authority and State Court Jurisdiction
Assignment #6. Problem 6, Materials p. 26; 28 U.S.C.
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§§ 1441, 1442, Materials p. 27; pp. 479-90 n.4; 492-
500; Supp. pp. 67-70; Materials p. 28 ("Note on Gregory
v. Ashcroft")
II. SUPREME COURT REVIEW OF STATE COURT DECISIONS
A. Establishment of Supreme Court Review
Assignment #7 28 U.S.C. §§ 1254, 1257, Materials p.
29; Supreme Court Rule 10, Materials p. 30; pp. 501-16;
521-32
B. Supreme Court Jurisdiction: The Relationship Between
State and Federal Law
1. Introduction to the Independent and Adequate
State Ground
Assignment #8: Problems 8a-d, Materials p. 31;
pp. 533-35; 549 n.4-550; 539-47; 552 n.7; 554-57;
Supp. pp. 71-74
2. Problems of "Incorporation" and Federal
Protection of State Created Rights
Assignment #9: Problems 9a-e, Materials pp. 32-
33; pp. 557-67; 569-81; Supp. pp. 74-77
3. State Remedies for Federal Rights Violations and
State Procedures for Enforcing Federal Rights
Assignment #10: pp. 581-88; Supp. pp. 77-78; pp.
628-32; 637 n.8-38; 595-600; Materials pp. 34-42
("State Court Forfeitures")
4. The Relation of Procedural Default Doctrine to
Federal Habeas Corpus Jurisdiction
Assignment #11: Problem 11, Materials pp. 43-
44; 28 U.S.C. §§ 2241, 2254-55, Materials pp.
45-46; pp. 1477-88 n.1; 1539-40; 1506-22 n.6;
Supp. pp. 220-22; 246-47; Materials pp. 47-49
("Models of Federal Habeas Corpus")
Assignment #12: pp. 610-23 n.7; Problem 12,
Materials p. 50; pp.1524-38; 1546 n.5-1552;
Supp. pp. 248-52; 253-54 ("Note on McCleskey v.
Zant")
5. Retroactivity
Assignment #13: Problem 13, Materials p. 51;
Supp. pp. 222-45
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III. ELEMENTS OF FEDERAL QUESTION JURISDICTION
A. Scope of the Constitutional Jurisdiction
Assignment #14: Problems 14a-b, Materials p. 52; pp.
967-75; Materials p. 53 ("Questions About Osborn"); pp.
878-81; 975-82; 986-87; Supp. pp. 129-31
B. Scope of the Statutory Jurisdiction
1. Basic Structure and the Well-Pleaded Complaint
Rule
Assignment #15. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1337-38,
1441-42, 1446-47, Materials pp. 54-56; pp. 960-
66; 989-90; 997-99; 1052-56 n.4; 1767-69; 990-95
n.1; Supp. pp. 131-32
2. Inclusionary and Exclusionary Principles
Assignment #16. pp. 999-1022; Supp. p. 132
3. Jurisdiction Over Declaratory Judgment Actions
Assignment #17. 28 U.S.C. §§ 2201-02,
Materials p. 57; pp. 1027-40; Problem 17,
Materials p. 58; Supp. p. 133
C. Pendent Jurisdiction
Assignment #18: pp. 1040-51; Supp. pp. 134-37; 28
U.S.C. § 1367, Materials p. 59
IV. LAW APPLIED IN THE DISTRICT COURTS: FEDERAL COMMON
LAW
A. Introduction: Judicial Competence and Discretion in the
Crafting of Federal Common Law
Assignment #19: Problem 19, Materials p. 60; 28 U.S.C.
§ 1652, Materials p. 61; p. 849; pp. 783-87; 854-63;
Materials pp. 62-66 (U.S. v. Kimbell Foods); Supp. pp.
94-95
B. Sources of Lawmaking Authority
1. Proprietary Interests of the United States
Assignment #20A: pp. 854-57 (reprise)
2. Private Litigation Involving Federal Interests
Assignment #20B: Supp. pp. 96-111
3. Implication from Jurisdictional Grants
Assignment #20C: pp. 878-95
4. Federal Common Law Generated by Statutes
Assignment #20D: Problem 20D, Materials pp.
67-68; Supp. pp. 114 n.6-118; 564-66 (reprise)
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5. Procedural Rules
Assignment #20E: pp. 628-32 (reprise)
C. Implication of Remedies
1. Remedies for Statutory Violations
Assignment #21: pp. 935-43; 945 n.4-950; Supp.
pp. 123-24; 42 U.S.C. § 1983, Materials p. 69;
pp. 1244(c)-1247(d); Supp. pp. 173-75
2. Remedies for Constitutional Violations
Assignment #22: Problem 22, Materials pp. 70-
71; pp. 917-26; 927 n.3-934; Supp. pp. 121-23;
pp. 1298 n.6-1301
V. ACTIONS AGAINST THE GOVERNMENT AND ITS OFFICIALS
A. Sovereign Immunity and the Eleventh Amendment
1. Foundations
Assignment #23: U.S. Const. Art. III and
Amendment 11; pp. 1090-1110; 1114-16 n.4;
Materials p. 72 ("Note on Federal Sovereign
Immunity"); pp. 1159-70 n.9; 1171 n.11-1173
2. Modern Doctrine
Assignment #24. Problem 24, Materials pp. 73-
74; pp. 1173-79; 1182-94 n.5; Supp. pp. 151-71
Assignment #25: pp. 1194 n.7-1204; Supp. pp.
185-86; Materials pp. 75-81 ("Tax Refund
Litigation")
B. Federal Statutory Protection Against Unlawful State
Action
1. The Scope of the Section 1983 Cause of Action
Assignment #26: Problem 26, Materials p. 82; 42
U.S.C. § 1983, Materials p. 69 (reprise); pp.
1229-44(a); 1259-68; 1269 n.3-1271 n.4(b); 1274
n.7-1276 n.7; Supp. pp. 187-89
2. Proper Defendants, Causal Responsibility, and
Immunities
Assignment #27: pp. 1251 n.4-1257 n.6; Supp.
pp. 175-86; pp. 1277-92; 1295 n.4-1301; Supp.
pp. 190-93
3. Res Judicata
Assignment #28: 28 U.S.C. § 1738, Materials
p. 83; Materials pp. 84-90 ("Refresher Examples
on Res Judicata"); pp. 1615-30; Supp. pp. 259-60
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VI. JUDICIAL FEDERALISM: LIMITS ON DISTRICT COURT
JURISDICTION OR ITS EXERCISE
A. Statutory Limits on Federal Jurisdiction
Assignment #29: 28 U.S.C. §§ 2283, 1341, 1342,
2284, Materials p. 91; pp. 1308-33; Supp. pp. 195-97;
pp. 1337-42; Materials p. 92 ("Questions on the Anti-
Injunction Act")
B. Non-Statutory Restrictions
1. The Exhaustion Requirement, Pullman, and
Related Doctrine
Assignment #30: Problems 30A 1-2, Materials p.
93; pp. 1346-51 n.6; Problem 30B, Materials p.
94; pp. 1354-67 n.10; 1375-77; 1195-1201
(reprise); Supp. pp. 200-03
2. Younger Abstention
Assignment #31: pp. 1383-94 n.4; 1397 n.6-1400
n.3; 1406-15
Assignment #32: Problem 32, Materials p. 95;
pp. 1416-38; Supp. pp. 203-14
C. Review
Assignment #33: Problem 33, Materials pp. 96-100; pp.
1630-38
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